The Transcendental Phenomenological Argument against Eternalism
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Tartalom: http://real.mtak.hu/171962/
Archívum: REAL
Gyűjtemény: Status = Published
Subject = B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion / filozófia, pszichológia, vallás: BD Speculative Philosophy / rendszeres filozófia: BD1 Metaphysics / metafizika
Subject = B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion / filozófia, pszichológia, vallás: BD Speculative Philosophy / rendszeres filozófia: BD1 Metaphysics / metafizika: BD11 Ontology / ontológia
Type = Article
Cím:
The Transcendental Phenomenological Argument against Eternalism
Létrehozó:
Bernáth, László
Inan, Daniel Haydar
Kiadó:
De Gruyter
Dátum:
2023
Téma:
BD1 Metaphysics / metafizika
BD11 Ontology / ontológia
Tartalmi leírás:
In this paper, we argue against eternalism on the basis of certain phenomenological considerations regarding our experiential life in a relatively novel way. Contrary to well-known phenomenological arguments that attempt to refute tenseless theories of time, our argument that we call the Transcendental Phenomenological Argument against Eternalism is against both tenseless and tensed versions of eternalism. The argument is based on the fact that one experiences a phenomenological succession of experiences, and it shows that perdurantist forms of eternalism have to either deny this fact or should embrace ad hoc and metaphysically implausible assumptions about the nature of the mind. As we argue, neither of these options seems to be too promising.
Nyelv:
angol
Típus:
Article
PeerReviewed
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Formátum:
text
Azonosító:
Bernáth, László and Inan, Daniel Haydar (2023) The Transcendental Phenomenological Argument against Eternalism. METAPHYSICA. pp. 1-17. ISSN 1437-2053
Kapcsolat:
doi:10.1515/mp-2021-0045
Létrehozó:
cc_by