| Tartalom: |
http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/1322/ |
| Archívum: |
Corvinus Kutatások |
| Gyűjtemény: |
Status = In Press
Subject = Mathematics, Econometrics
Type = Monograph
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| Cím: |
Stable sets in one-seller assignment games
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| Létrehozó: |
Bednay, Dezső
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| Kiadó: |
Annals of Operation Research
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| Dátum: |
2013-07-10
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| Téma: |
Mathematics, Econometrics
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| Tartalmi leírás: |
We consider von Neumann -- Morgenstern stable sets in assignment games with one seller and many buyers. We prove that a set of imputations is a stable set if and only if it is the graph of a certain type of continuous and monotone function. This characterization enables us to interpret the standards of behavior encompassed by the various stable sets as possible outcomes of well-known auction procedures when groups of buyers may form bidder rings. We also show that the union of all stable sets can be described as the union of convex polytopes all of whose vertices are marginal
contribution payoff vectors. Consequently, each stable set is contained in the Weber set. The Shapley value, however, typically falls outside the union of all stable sets.
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| Típus: |
Monograph
NonPeerReviewed
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| Formátum: |
application/pdf
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| Azonosító: |
Bednay, Dezső (2013) Stable sets in one-seller assignment games. Manual. Annals of Operation Research. (In Press)
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| Kapcsolat: |
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